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The ability to read the minds of others (i.e., to mentalize) requires
that perceivers understand a wide range of different kinds of mental
states, including not only others’ beliefs and knowledge but also their
feelings, desires, and preferences. Moreover, although such
inferences may occasionally rely on observable features of
a situation, perceivers more typically mentalize under conditions of
‘‘uncertainty,’’ in which they must generate plausible hypotheses
about a target’s mental state from ambiguous or otherwise
underspeciﬁed information. Here, we use functional neuroimaging
to dissociate the neural bases of these 2 distinct social--cognitive
challenges: 1) mentalizing about different types of mental states
(beliefs vs. preferences) and 2) mentalizing under conditions of
varying ambiguity. Although these 2 aspects of mentalizing have
typically been confounded in earlier research, we observed a double
dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental
state and ambiguity. Whereas ventral and dorsal aspects of medial
prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambig-
uous inferences regardless of the type of mental state, the right
temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between
beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty. These results
underscore the emerging consensus that, rather than comprising
a single mental operation, social cognition makes ﬂexible use of
different processes as a function of the particular demands of the
social context.
Keywords: medial prefrontal cortex, mentalizing, neuroimaging, social
cognition, theory of mind
Introduction
Unlike encounters with falling tree branches, stalled cars, or
other inanimate objects, an understanding of other people
requires the tacit recognition that their behavior is inﬂuenced
by the contents of their minds (Dennett 1987). However, the
ability to infer the nature of those contents—that is, to
mentalize—poses a series of nontrivial challenges to human
cognition. Perceivers only rarely receive explicit reports about
another person’s thoughts, feelings, or desires and must instead
interpret ambiguous hints about the hidden inner workings of
other minds: for example, attempting to uncover the possible
signiﬁcance of an eyebrow raise, sidelong glance, vocal
inﬂection, or sudden departure. Each of these bits of in-
formation, in turn, may be clues to a wide range of possible
kinds of mental states, such as what a person is thinking (i.e.,
beliefs), feeling (emotions), desiring (wants and preferences),
or intending (goals). Finally, having generated a provisional
model of another person’s mind, perceivers must also calculate
how the contents of that mind are likely to inﬂuence the
person’s behavior.
Given the complexity and diversity of the inferences we
make about others, humans likely developed a suite of
cognitive processes that, together, allow us to trafﬁc so readily
in the mental worlds of other people. Consistent with this
possibility that social cognition comprises several distinct
processes that meet different computational demands,
researchers have identiﬁed a set of several brain regions that
respond consistently when considering the minds of others:
dorsal and ventral aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC), the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial parietal
cortex, and the superior temporal sulcus (Fletcher et al. 1995;
Goel et al. 1995; Gallagher et al. 2000, 2002; Mitchell et al. 2002;
Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Van Overwalle 2009). Having
identiﬁed this constellation of regions involved in human social
abilities, researchers have now begun to isolate speciﬁc mental
processes subserved by each, with the aim of decomposing
social cognition into its constituent parts.
Importantly, the main challenge in this enterprise has been
delineating the dimensions along which social cognition might
be expected to divide. One natural starting place has been the
observation that perceivers must infer a variety of different
types of mental states, such as beliefs, feelings, and intentions,
and indeed, researchers have recently suggested that different
brain regions may subserve mentalizing about these different
kinds of mental content. For example, a right-lateralized region
of TPJ has been implicated speciﬁcally in representing others’
beliefs (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Saxe and Powell 2006), and
MPFC has emerged consistently from tasks involving inferences
about affective states or preferences (Mitchell, Banaji, Macrae
2005a; Hynes et al. 2006; Mitchell et al. 2006; Vollm et al. 2006;
Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz 2007). Taken together, these
observations have led some commentators to conclude that
activation in TPJ and MPFC may be modulated speciﬁcally by
differences among particular types of mental content to be
inferred (e.g., Van Overwalle 2009).
However, in addition to inferring different types of mental
states, humans must also mentalize under varying degrees of
certainty. In some situations, an inference about the state of
anotherperson’smindisallbutdictatedbygiveninformation.For
example,whenSarahputshercookieintheofﬁcerefrigeratorand
returns to retrieve it 5 min later, we are fairly conﬁdent that she
‘‘believes’’hercookieisintherefrigerator.Similarly,ifSarahalways
chooses oatmeal cookies from her many dessert options, we can
be fairly conﬁdent that Sarah ‘‘likes’’ or ‘‘prefers’’ oatmeal cookies.
In these cases, perceivers’ inferences can be formulated using
a simple set of rules operating over explicit, observable in-
formation about a target. To infer where Sarah thinks her cookie
willbe5minaftershestashesitintherefrigerator,perceiversmay
simply apply the rule that people generally can recall easily what
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has a particularfondnessfor oatmeal cookies byapplyingthe rule
that if someone freely and consistently chooses an object (e.g.,
oatmeal cookies) over comparable alternatives, then that person
likely prefers that object (Kelley 1972). In both cases, readily
observable information can feed into some basic social--cognitive
rules to produce fairly unambiguous inferences about another
person’s mental states.
In contrast, many inferences about human minds take place
under conditions of far greater ambiguity. When Steve arrives
home and hears voices inside his apartment, will he believe that
he is being robbed, that he accidentally left the TV on, that his
parents have made a surprise visit, or something else? Similarly,
if Steve always arrives late to lecture when the only available
seats are in the back of the room, we cannot be particularly
conﬁdent that he really does prefer to sit far away from the
professor. Because the information in such situations is
insufﬁcient to constrain one’s inferences fully, perceivers must
make do with provisional hypotheses about a target’s mental
states, which remain ambiguous until further clues about their
contents are discerned. Although perceivers do make assump-
tions about other minds even under conditions of relative
ambiguity (Gilbert 1998), it is unlikely that they do so using the
kind of rule-based processes that can be brought to bear more
fruitfully for inferences of greater certainty. Rather, given
a scarcity of suitably deﬁnitive inputs to our social--cognitive
rules, mentalizing under uncertainty likely relies on an
alternative, more ﬂexible, and internally generated system for
making sense of other minds.
In attempting to identify the dimensions along which social
cognition dissociates, most extant research has confounded
differences in mentalizing about varying types of internal states
with differences in mentalizing under varying degrees of
certainty. For example, although the TPJ has been speciﬁcally
linked to a particular type of mental state—beliefs—the
information provided in typical belief mentalizing tasks
essentially dictates the mental state of the protagonist, making
perceivers’ inferences unambiguous. In the bulk of experi-
ments identifying the TPJ with beliefs (Saxe and Kanwisher
2003; Samson et al. 2004; Saxe and Wexler 2005; Saxe and
Powell 2006), perceivers read stories based on the classic
‘‘Sally--Anne’’ problem developed for use in children: perceivers
watch Sally place her ball in a basket and then, while Sally is
away and unaware, they watch Anne surreptitiously move the
ball to a second location, at which point they are asked where
Sally will look for her ball when she returns. This kind of
situation contains all the information needed for an un-
ambiguous, rule-based inference about what Sally believes or
thinks (i.e., that the ball is still safely hidden in its original
location). In contrast, the information provided in typical
preference or affective mentalizing tasks leaves inferences
much more open-ended (Hynes et al. 2006; Mitchell et al. 2006;
Vollm et al. 2006; Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz 2007). For
example, participants might be told that Sarah is politically
liberal and subsequently be asked whether she would prefer to
go hiking or go to the beach (Mitchell et al. 2006). The
frequent conﬂation of these 2 dimensions raises the possibility
that ﬁndings previously attributed to differences in type of
mental state, such as the preferential engagement of MPFC
during inferences about others’ preferences, may in fact be
better attributed to differences in the certainty with which
such mental state inferences can be made.
Indeed, a substantial amount of other research supports the
possibility that MPFC may subserve mentalizing under un-
certainty rather than inferences about particular types of
mental states per se. Recently, this region has been implicated
in processes supporting the ability to draw on elements of
relevant past experiences in order to formulate novel
predictions (Addis et al. 2007; Buckner and Carroll 2007), as
well as in the use of one’s own experience to mentalize about
others (Mitchell et al. 2006; Jenkins et al. 2008). When
inferences are relatively underspeciﬁed by situational con-
straints, perceivers may ﬁnd it especially useful to mentalize on
the basis of such simulated, internally generated information,
whether that information arises from their own ﬁrsthand
experience or from having observed similar circumstances in
the past. That is, perceivers may ﬁnd it particularly useful to
rely on associations formed through past experiences as they
generate predictions about what another person may be
thinking or feeling in ambiguous or uncertain situations
(Mitchell forthcoming). In contrast, such a process may be
less useful under circumstances in which another person’s
mental state could be inferred simply by applying general
‘‘rules’’ about human minds.
In the current experiment, we investigated the extent to
which regions associated with mentalizing would be modulated
independently by type of mental state (beliefs vs. preferences)
and the uncertainty surrounding one’s inference about it.
Participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance
imaging(fMRI)astheyreadshortvignettesthatsupportedeither
anunambiguousorambiguousinferenceaboutaperson’sbeliefs
or preferences. Unambiguous versions of each vignette were
writtensuchthattheinformation inthescenario wouldstrongly
suggest the mental state of the protagonist, whereas ambiguous
vignettesimpliedthattheprotagonist’smentalstatecouldbeany
oneofmultiplepossibilities.Foreachvignette,participantswere
obliged to consider either the protagonist’s beliefs or his or her
preferences, thus allowing us to dissociate brain regions that
were sensitive to differences in mental state type (belief and
preference) from those sensitive to differences in mentalizing
certainty (ambiguous and unambiguous). Although interested in
the potential effects of these dimensions across the brain, we
were particularly interested in examining the extent to which
MPFC contributions to social cognition are better characterized
as subserving inferences about affectively laden mental states
(suchaspreferences)orasmoregenerallysubservingambiguous
inferencesunderuncertainty.Moreover,thisdesignalsoallowed
us to test earlier claims that the TPJ speciﬁcally subserves
inferences about a particular type of mental state (i.e., beliefs).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifteen right-handed college undergraduates (9 females, age range 18--
22 years, mean age 19.8 years) with no history of neurological problems
participated in exchange for pay or course credit. Participants provided
informed consent in accordance with the guidelines maintained by
Massachusetts General Hospital.
Stimuli and Behavioral Procedure
Mentalizing Task
During scanning, participants read short vignettes relating the events of
an everyday scenario. Vignettes conveyed information about either
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Supplementary Material for full stimulus set). Unambiguous versions of
each scenario were written such that the information in the scenario
would strongly suggest, but not state explicitly, the belief or preference
of the protagonist. Such scenarios relied heavily on perceptual truisms
about human beings (e.g., that they generally perceive objects in the
environment and generally remember what they have recently seen).
Ambiguous versions of each scenario were written such that the
protagonist’s belief or preference could plausibly be any one of
multiple possibilities under the circumstances provided, that is, the
information given did not dictate a correct response but rather left the
inference more open-ended. A slight change in what would otherwise
be an unambiguous scenario might render deterministic rules about the
human mind inapplicable and the scenario therefore ambiguous: for
example, if Sarah, on her way out the door having just put her cookie in
the refrigerator, hears Tom tell her he’s moving her cookie but he does
not say where (belief) or if Sarah always eats an oatmeal cookie after
dinner but there are never any other options because Tom always buys
dessert (preference), we can be less certain about Sarah’s mental states
given the information provided. Unambiguous belief vignettes were
created in both ‘‘true belief’’ and ‘‘false belief’’ versions; however, no
differences were observed between true and false beliefs, and analyses
were therefore collapsed across this dimension.
Stimuli in all 4 groups (ambiguous preference, ambiguous belief,
unambiguous preference, and unambiguous belief) were matched for
length (mean number of characters = 213.5). Matched control stories in
which participants inferred the content of physical representations
(such as those in photographs or on maps) were used for comparison
(Zaitchik 1990). For example, participants might read about a tree
house that was photographed before being painted blue and be asked
to identify the color in which it would have appeared in the photo
(Table 1).
Following each mentalizing scenario, participants answered a single
multiple-choice question about the protagonist’s belief or preference;
following each nonsocial scenario, participants answered a question
about a physical representation (such as a map or photograph). For all
scenarios, the story and question remained onscreen together for a total
of 10 s, at which point the story disappeared and 4 response choices
were presented for 4 s. In all conditions, participants were asked to
formulate an answer to every question before any response choices
appeared. Accordingly, to allow for the possibility that participants
generatedideasotherthanthoserepresentedbyouranswerchoices,the
fourth response option was always a none-of-the-above possibility (e.g.,
‘‘Somewhere else’’). Each trial was followed by 12 s of ﬁxation. Each
participant completed a total of 60 mentalizing scenarios and 12
nonsocial scenarios across 4 functional runs, with presentation
randomized across participants such that no participant ever encoun-
tered both an ambiguous and an unambiguous version of the same story.
Imaging Procedure
fMRI data were collected using a 3-T Siemens Trio scanner across 4
functional runs of 234 volume acquisitions (26 axial slices, 5 mm thick,
1 mm skip). Functional imaging used a gradient-echo echo planar pulse
sequence (time repetition = 2 s, time echo = 35 ms, 3.75 3 3.75 in-plane
resolution). Prior to the functional scans, we collected a high-resolution
T1-weighted structural scan (magnetization-prepared rapid gradient
echo). PsyScope software for Mac OS X (L. Bonatti, International School
of Advanced Studies, Trieste, Italy) was used to project stimuli onto
a screen at the end of the magnet bore, which participants viewed via
a mirror mounted on the head coil. A pillow and foam cushions were
placed inside the coil to minimize head movement.
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM2 (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). First, functional data
were time corrected for differences in acquisition time between slices
for each whole-brain volume and realigned to correct for head
movement. Functional data were then transformed into a standard
anatomical space (3-mm isotropic voxels) based on the ICBM 152 brain
template (Montreal Neurological Institute). Normalized data were then
spatially smoothed (8 mm full width at half maximum) using a Gaussian
kernel.
Statistical analyses were performed using the general linear model in
which the blocked design was modeled using a boxcar function and
additional covariates of no interest (a session mean and a linear trend).
This analysis was performed individually for each participant, and
contrast images for each participant were subsequently entered into
a second-level analysis treating participants as random effect. Peak
coordinates were identiﬁed using a statistical criterion of 25 or more
contiguous voxels at a voxelwise threshold of P < 0.0001. Monte Carlo
simulations (S. Slotnick, Boston College) of our brain volume conﬁrmed
that these criteria provided a brainwise alpha level of P < 0.05,
corrected for multiple comparisons.
Table 1
Stimulus examples
Unambiguous Ambiguous
Belief Pam is an avid gardener. The weather was so warm today that all the tulips
in Pam’s backyard suddenly bloomed. The tulips next to Pam’s ofﬁce still
have not yet ﬂowered, though. Pam has been at work all day.
Pam is an avid gardener and is particularly fond of her tulips. It’s early
spring, and a few of her ﬂowers have begun to bloom. When Pam got
home from work today, her neighbor told her she might want to take
a look at her tulip beds.
What does Pam think? What does Pam think?
1. Her tulips have bloomed 1. Her tulips have bloomed
2. Her tulips have not bloomed yet 2. Her tulips have not bloomed yet
3. Her tulips have died 3. Her tulips have died
4. Something else 4. Something else
Preference Erin has 2 classes on Tuesdays. Today was the last day of Tuesday classes.
In both of her classes, Erin is usually one of the ﬁrst people there, and she
always sits in the back.
Erin has 2 classes on Tuesdays. Today was the ﬁrst day of Tuesday classes
for the semester. In both of her classes, the room was quite full when
Erin arrived, and she sat in the back.
Where does Erin like to sit in class? Where does Erin like to sit in class?
1. In the front 1. In the front
2. In the back 2. In the back
3. In the middle 3. In the middle
4. Somewhere else 4. Somewhere else
Nonsocial The color printer cartridge just ran out of blue ink, but
it kept printing anyway. It printed a picture of
a healthy grass lawn from a computer screen.
In the printed picture, what color is the grass?
1. Yellow
2. Green
3. Blue
4. Something else
Note. Mentalizing scenarios support inferences that differ the type of mental state to be inferred (belief vs. preference) and the certainty with which the inference can be made (unambiguous vs.
ambiguous). Nonsocial scenarios support inferences without mental content.
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mentalizing > nonsocial (i.e., all unambiguous and ambiguous belief
and preference stories vs. nonsocial control stories). These regions were
then interrogated for differences among the mentalizing scenarios by
comparing the parameter estimates associated with the 4 mentalizing
trial types: unambiguous belief, unambiguous preference, ambiguous
belief, and ambiguous preference. To conﬁrm the results of the region-
of-interest analysis, we also conducted whole-brain, random-effects
analyses of unambiguous versus ambiguous scenarios (collapsing across
content type) and belief versus preference scenarios (collapsing across
ambiguity).
Results
Behavioral Results
To conﬁrm our conditionalization of scenarios as unambiguous
andambiguous,weﬁrstexaminedthedistributionofparticipants’
responsestoeachquestionasafunctionofambiguity.Speciﬁcally,
for each question, we calculated the proportion of participants
who chose the most commonly selected of the 3 possible
contentful answers, excluding ‘‘none of the above’’ responses.
Participants overwhelmingly converged on a single answer to
eachunambiguousscenario,choosingthemodalresponse87%of
thetime.Incontrast,responsesweremorevariableforambiguous
scenarios, with participants agreeing on a single answer only 51%
of the time, v
2 (1, n = 15) = 8.14, P < 0.005). Moreover, for
unambiguous questions, participants chose ‘‘none of the above’’
less than 1% of the time, whereas for ambiguous questions,
participants made use of this option 30% of the time, v
2 (1, n =
15) = 27.13, P < 0.0001. This pattern of responding was observed
for both beliefs (88% agreement for unambiguous belief vs. 53%
agreementforambiguousbeliefinferences)andpreferences(84%
agreement for unambiguous preference vs. 51% agreement for
ambiguous preference inferences).
fMRI Results
The primary question of interest was the extent to which brain
regions involved in mentalizing would be sensitive to differences
in content type and in ambiguity. To identify brain regions
involved in mentalizing, we ﬁrst conducted a whole-brain,
random-effects analysis of all ‘‘mentalizing > nonsocial’’ scenar-
ios. This contrast revealed a set of regions commonly associated
with social cognition, including both dorsal and ventral MPFC
(vMPFC), right and left TPJ, the superior temporal sulcus, the
temporal poles, and medial parietal cortex (Fig. 1). We then
interrogated these regions of interest for their sensitivity to
content type, ambiguity, and the interaction between these 2
factors. The response of 3 regions was modulated by ambiguity
and/or content (see Table 2). First, dorsal MPFC (dMPFC)
demonstrated greater response during ambiguous than un-
ambiguous inferences, F1,14 = 7.44, P < 0.02, d = 0.73, but did not
differentiate between preferences and beliefs, F1,14 = 1.72, P >
0.21, d = 0.35. In contrast, right TPJ was characterized by greater
activation during belief than preference scenarios, F1,14 = 9.74,
P < 0.01, d = 0.83, but did not differentiate between scenarios as
a function of ambiguity, F1,14 = 0.79, P > 0.38, d = 0.24, consistent
with suggestions that right TPJ contributes speciﬁcally to
mentalizing about beliefs (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Saxe and
Powell 2006). Finally, activation in vMPFC was characterized by
main effects of both ambiguity, F1,14 = 7.10, P < 0.02, d = 0.71,
and content, F1,14 = 12.26, P < 0.0005, d = 0.94, such that the
region responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous
inferences and also responded more during inferences about
preferences than during inferences about beliefs. All 3 regions
showed no evidence of an ambiguity 3 content interaction, all F
values < 1.65, P values > 0.22. In contrast, a marginally signiﬁcant
interaction between type and ambiguity was observed in medial
parietal cortex, F1,14 = 3.03, P < 0.10, d = 0.47, such that the
region responded more during unambiguous than ambiguous
inferences about beliefs but more during ambiguous than
unambiguous inferences about preferences; however, neither
the main effect of ambiguity (P > 0.45) nor the main effect of
content (P > 0.76) approached signiﬁcance in this region.
Moreover, the presence of a signiﬁcant 2-way interaction of
region 3 content, F2,42 = 9.10, P < 0.001, conﬁrmed that the
pattern of response to beliefs and preferences differed across
Figure 1. Average parameter estimates in dMPFC (A), vMPFC (B), and right TPJ (C) as a function of type of mental state (belief vs. preference) and mentalizing certainty
(unambiguous vs. ambiguous). Activation in both dorsal and vMPFC was characterized by a main effect of certainty, such that both regions responded more during ambiguous
than unambiguous inferences, regardless of content. In contrast, activation in right TPJ was characterized only by a main effect of content type, such that it responded more
during inferences about beliefs than during inferences about preferences. Error bars represent conﬁdence interval for within-subject designs (Loftus and Masson 1994).
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ambiguity did not reach signiﬁcance, F2,42 = 1.79, P > 0.17.
To conﬁrm these ﬁndings, we also conducted a whole-brain,
random-effects contrast of ‘‘ambiguous > unambiguous’’ scenar-
ios.Consistentwiththeregion-of-interestanalysis,thesoleregion
to emerge from this contrast was dMPFC. Additionally, whole-
brain, random-effects contrasts of belief versus preference
scenarios underscored the differential engagement of right TPJ
and vMPFC as a function of content. Whereas right TPJ emerged
from the contrast of ‘‘belief > preference,’’ vMPFC emerged from
the contrast of ‘‘preference > belief’’ (Table 3).
Discussion
The human ability to apprehend the mental states of others
requires solutions to a host of cognitive challenges. The
current ﬁndings add to the emerging empirical consensus that
these challenges are met by an equally varied set of distinct
cognitive processes rather than a single, monolithic ‘‘theory-of-
mind’’ module. Replicating earlier research (Saxe and Kanwisher
2003; Saxe and Powell 2006), mentalizing about others’ beliefs
was associated with greater activity in right TPJ compared with
mentalizing about others’ preferences or to nonsocial process-
ing. That understanding that others’ beliefs would rely on such
specialized processing has been anticipated by a number of
commentators, who have pointed out that such inferences
place unique demands on cognition, including a requirement
to understand representational aspects of others’ minds and to
suspend attention to one’s own knowledge in favor of
understanding the unique knowledge possessed by another
person (Apperly et al. 2005; Saxe 2006; Mitchell 2009).
In contrast, regardless of the type of mental state under
consideration, both dorsal and ventral aspects of MPFC
responded more during ambiguous, underspeciﬁed inferences
than during unambiguous, well-constrained inferences. Com-
parisons across past studies have observed greater MPFC
activation during relatively ambiguous inferences about pref-
erences than during relatively unambiguous inference about
beliefs, concluding that the relevant difference was in the type
of mental state being considered (Van Overwalle 2009).
However, the current results suggest a different conclusion.
Here, dMPFC did not distinguish between inferences about
beliefs and preferences when such inferences were matched
for ambiguity, suggesting that what primarily drives the
engagement of this region is not the type of mental state
being inferred but rather the computational demands associ-
ated with constructing novel predictions from
minimal information (Johnson-Laird 1994, 2001; Mitchell
forthcoming).
What kinds of computational demands might these be?
Recently, a number of commentators have suggested that
MPFC contributes to a network of regions that subserves the
construction of simulated scenarios. For example, in addition to
its ubiquitous role in mentalizing, MPFC is consistently engaged
by attempts to prospectively imagine the future and to
retrospectively remember the past (Addis et al. 2007; Buckner
and Carroll 2007; Schacter et al. 2007; Spreng et al. 2009), both
of which require perceivers to use internally generated
simulations of a situation that is divorced from the current
context. Likewise, mentalizing under uncertainty may require
perceivers to engage in similar processes of simulation, for
example, by imagining their own response to an analogous
situation or by drawing on aspects of comparable events from
their own life. That is, when ambiguity about another person’s
mental states is high, our inferences about other minds may be
guided by the contents of our own internal mental experience,
mediated by MPFC (Mitchell, Banaji, Macrae 2005b; Mitchell
et al. 2006; Jenkins et al. 2008).
Intriguingly, this observation suggests that one reason that
MPFC has been so consistently associated with social cognition
may be that inferences about the minds of other people are
necessarily less constrained than inferences about the physical
world. Because the mind of another person is inherently
mutable and impossible to perceive directly, inferences about
human minds may be fundamentally more ambiguous than
inferences about our inanimate, physical surroundings (Mitch-
ell forthcoming). To the extent that MPFC contributes to
simulating plausible outcomes for indistinct and shifting
phenomena, this region should be expected to participate
frequently in understanding the minds of others.
However, such MPFC-mediated processes might also be
engaged during nonsocial inferences that likewise require the
consideration of multiple, ‘‘fuzzy’’ alternatives based on in-
ternally generated simulations. Humans must often make
Table 3
Peak voxel and number of voxels for brain regions obtained from random-effects contrasts of
certainty and type of mental state P \ 0.05, corrected
xyzVoxels
Ambiguous [ unambiguous
MPFC 4 36 40 241
Unambiguous [ ambiguous
No regions observed at P \ 0.05, corrected
Belief [ preference
R TPJ 50 52 20 25
L TPJ 50 52 22 101
Preference [ belief
vMPFC 6 56 0 280
L orbitofrontal cortex 22 36 63 0
R insula 50 12 8 162
46 10 43 5
L inferior frontal gyrus 46 2 14 30
Midcingulate cortex 6 83 03 2
Posterior cingulate cortex 0 34 30 495
R intraparietal sulcus 30 42 40 1739
L intraparietal sulcus 30 56 54 280
30 36 40 82
46 38 52 48
R middle temporal gyrus 58 50 10 111
Cerebellum 18 64 46 41
R lateral occipitotemporal sulcus 46 60 8 149
Superior parietal gyrus 8 78 40 52
Occipital cortex 4 90 20 46
Table 2
Peak voxel and number of voxels for brain regions obtained from the random-effects contrast of
all mentalizing scenarios [ nonsocial scenarios, P \ 0.05, corrected
xy zVoxels
dMPFC 0 54 32 186
vMPFC 85 0 2 940
R superior temporal sulcus 56 10 20 133
L superior temporal sulcus 68 34 4 215
R TPJ 54 56 22 305
L TPJ 48 62 36 272
Medial parietal cortex 8 60 18 2477
R occipital cortex 12 102 8 171
L occipital cortex 24 100 6 269
Note. Coordinates refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute stereotaxic space. R, right; L, left.
408 Mentalizing under Uncertainty
d Jenkins and Mitchellcomplex, underdetermined inferences outside the social
domain, such as when deciding what kind of weather to
expect during an upcoming trip or how the stock market will
be affected by lower interest rates. In and of themselves, the
current results cannot adjudicate whether MPFC contributions
to uncertain inference making are limited to social situations
(i.e., mentalizing) or may extend to relatively less social
contexts. Indeed, recent ﬁndings demonstrate that regions of
the right TPJ previously thought to be selective for social
cognition also contribute to decidedly nonsocial tasks (Mitchell
2008; Scholz et al. 2009), raising the possibility that MPFC will
also prove to participate across both social and nonsocial
situations. The possibility that this region subserves processing
of ambiguous information across multiple domains awaits
future empirical test.
The Flexible Nature of Social Cognition
The current results also have implications for a longstanding
debate over the question of how one person goes about ‘‘reading
the mind’’ of another. Psychologists and philosophers have
together posited 2 main accounts of the processes by which
human beings understand other minds: broadly, those that are
‘‘simulationist’’ (Heal 1986; Gordon 1992) and those that are
more ‘‘rule based’’ (also known as ‘‘theory’’ theories; Gopnik and
Wellman 1994). Speciﬁcally, simulationist theories take as their
starting point the observation that, although perceivers can
never access the mind of another person directly, they do have
constant and direct access to the conscious experience of one
mind—their own—which they may be able to use as a model in
which to understand the mental experience of another. Such
theories suggest that, consciously or unconsciously, perceivers
appeal to aspects of their own experience in order to generate
insights into other minds. In contrast, rule-based theories
emphasize the accumulation over one’s lifetime of probabilistic
laws about how human minds work (e.g., ‘‘people generally
remember what they did 5 min ago’’; ‘‘when people choose an
object freely and consistently, they generally like that object’’),
which can be applied as relevant situations arise. Although
simulationist and rule-based theories of social cognition have
often been portrayed as mutually exclusive possibilities for how
humans understand the minds of others, the current study
suggests a more hybrid view. On one hand, rule-based
mentalizing may be a useful strategy when perceivers reason
about unambiguous mental states in ways that are strongly
guided by explicit contextual information. However, more self-
based simulationist processes may be needed to infer mental
states under conditions of greater uncertainty, that is, when
contextual cues less ﬁrmly constrain the possible goings on of
another person’s mind.
Interestingly, although both vMPFC and dMPFC differenti-
ated between ambiguous and unambiguous inferences, vMPFC
also showed greater activation during inferences about
preferences than during inferences about beliefs. Analysis of
participants’ agreement on a single response for each vignette
conﬁrmed that preference scenarios were no more ambiguous
than belief scenarios, and no other regions sensitive to
ambiguity (e.g., dMPFC) distinguished between preferences
and beliefs. As such, this ﬁnding replicates earlier studies that
demonstrated greater response in vMPFC when mentalizing
about others’ affective states than their cognitive states (Hynes
et al. 2006; Vollm et al. 2006; Shamay-Tsoory and Aharon-Peretz
2007) but suggests that this region may be sensitive not only to
type of mental state being inferred but also the ambiguity of the
information on which such an inference can be made (cf., Van
Overwalle 2009).
A possible, albeit speculative, explanation for the less
selective functional proﬁle observed in vMPFC builds on social
psychological research on attribution, which has long distin-
guished between explanations of behavior that focus on ‘‘the
person’’ versus those that focus on ‘‘the situation’’ (Heider
1958). In the current study, unambiguous preference scenarios
supported highly certain inferences because of what perceivers
knew about their protagonists (i.e., the person), for example,
that someone chose a particular item consistently despite
having other options. In contrast, unambiguous belief scenarios
supported highly certain inferences because they contained
strong situational constraints, such that most human beings
would be expected to believe the same thing under the same
circumstances (Gilbert 1998), for example, that someone put
an object in a particular place and returned to retrieve it a few
minutes later. One possibility is that activity in vMPFC, which
responded more during unambiguous inferences about prefer-
ences than during unambiguous inferences about beliefs (P <
0.02), could be associated speciﬁcally with person-focused
attribution (Mitchell et al. 2005). This hypothesis raises the
interesting possibility that vMPFC may respond more strongly
to stable, idiosyncratic beliefs (such as a person’s belief in
ghosts or karma) that provoke high levels of person-based
attribution than to transient preferences that depend heavily
on the particular context (a person prefers mojitos to mimosas,
but not before noon). Because the current study relied
primarily on transient beliefs and stable preferences, additional
research is needed to determine the speciﬁc contributions to
mentalizing made by vMPFC, including its involvement in
situation- versus person-based attribution.
Conclusion
The current ﬁndings continue the ongoing work of cleaving
the functional neuroanatomy of social cognition into its
constituent parts. Rather than comprising a single, monolithic
process for contemplating the minds of others, recent research
has increasingly made clear that social cognition decomposes
into a number of distinct processes, each contributing some
speciﬁc function to overall human social competence. Here, we
suggest that one fruitful way to divide social cognition follows
from the fact that perceivers face a number of uniquely
different mentalizing challenges: not only the ability to infer
a wide variety of mental states—such as beliefs, knowledge,
feelings, and preferences—but also the ability to mentalize
under varying degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity. The
current results suggest that the human brain appears to
respond to such demands by selectively engaging different
regions as a function of the particular social--cognitive
challenge to be met. Although some regions, such as the right
TPJ, appear to contribute to social cognition by subserving
inferences about speciﬁc types of mental states (i.e., beliefs),
other regions, such as the dMPFC, are indifferent to the
distinctions between others’ beliefs and preferences. Instead,
the MPFC may contribute preferentially to social cognition
when making sense of new situations, unfamiliar individuals, or
ambiguously motivated behavior—in other words, when
mentalizing under uncertainty.
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